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A Critique of the Yugoslavia War Crimes
Tribunal
MICHAEL P. SCHARF*
In his historic opening statement, Robert Jackson, the U.S. Chief
Prosecutor at Nuremberg said, "we must never forget that the record
on which we judge these defendants today is the record on which his-
tory will judge us tomorrow. To pass these defendants a poisoned chal-
ice is to put it to our lips as well."' It is ironic that history has not
been altogether kind to the Nuremberg Tribunal, labeling it "victor's
justice," denouncing its application of ex post facto law, and rebuking
its procedural shortcomings. Fifty years later, the world community
has created another war crimes tribunal - the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. In its first annual report, this new
Tribunal stated that "one can discern in the statute and the rules a
conscious effort to avoid some of the often-mentioned flaws of Nurem-
berg and Tokyo."2 Because it will serve as the model for future ad hoc
tribunals and a permanent international criminal court, the Yugoslav
Tribunal has recognized that to achieve success it must not only be
fair, but be seen as fair - a goal it has only partially achieved thus
far.
In many respects, the Yugoslavia Tribunal is a vast improvement
over its predecessor. Its detailed Rules of Procedure and Evidence, for
example, represent a tremendous advancement over the scant set of
rules that were fashioned for the Nuremberg Tribunal. Further, in
contrast to the Nuremberg Tribunal, the Yugoslavia Tribunal prohibits
trials in absentia, which are inherently unfair and are likely to be seen
as an empty gesture. And where the defense attorneys at Nuremberg
were prevented from full access to the Nuremberg Tribunal's eviden-
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tiary archives, 3 defendants before the Yugoslavia Tribunal are entitled
to any exculpatory evidence in the possession of the Prosecutor, and
both the prosecution and the defense are reciprocally bound to disclose
all documents and witnesses prior to trial. Finally, where the Nurem-
berg Tribunal has been criticized for compelling defendants to make
incriminating statements, the Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal guar-
antees every accused the right "not to be compelled to testify against
himself or to confess guilt,"4 in addition to a panoply of other rights
not recognized under the Nuremberg Charter.
The most often heard criticism of Nuremberg was its perceived ap-
plication of ex post facto laws, by holding persons responsible for the
first time in history for the "crime of aggression" and by applying the
concept of conspiracy which had never been recognized in continental
Europe. The creators of the Yugoslavia Tribunal went to great lengths
to avoid a similar perception with regard to the International Tribu-
nal. First, the Security Council adopted a series of resolutions that put
the people of the former Yugoslavia on notice that they were bound by
existing international humanitarian law, in particular the Geneva
Conventions. The resolutions enumerated the various types of reported
acts that would amount to breaches of this law, and warned that per-
sons who commit or order the commission of such breaches would be
held individually responsible. Second, the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Tribunal is defined on the basis of the highest standard of appli-
cable law, namely rules of law which are beyond any doubt part of cus-
tomary law to avoid any question of full respect for the principle
nullem crimen sine lege. It is particularly noteworthy that the crime of
waging a war of aggression, which engendered so much criticism after
Nuremberg, is not within the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Jurisdiction.
To some extent, the Yugoslavia Tribunal undermined this accom-
plishment in one of its first pre-trial rulings interpreting its subject
matter jurisdiction. In a pre-trial motion, the Defendant, Dusko Tadic,
challenged the lawfulness of his indictment under Article 2 (grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions) and Article 3 (violations of the
customs of war) of the Tribunal's Statute on the ground that there was
no international armed conflict in the region of Prijedor, where the
crimes he was charged with are said to have been committed. To sup-
port his argument, Tadic pointed out that in its proposal for the Tribu-
nal's Statute, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the
world's leading authority on international humanitarian law, "under-
lined the fact that according to International Humanitarian Law as it
stands today, the notion of war crimes is limited to situations of inter-
3. Kevin R. Chaney, Pitfalls and Imperatives: Applying the Lessons of Nuremberg to
the Yugoslav War Crimes Trials, 14 DicK. J. INT'L L. 57, 89 (1995).
4. Statute for the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C. Res. 827,
UN. SCOR., 47th Sess., 3217th mtg., art. 2 1(4)(g), UN. Doc. SIRES/827 (1993) [hereinaf-
ter Statute for the Yugoslav Tribunal].
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national armed conflict."5 In what can only be described as a novel in-
terpretation, the Yugoslavia Tribunal's Appeals Chamber decided on a
four to one vote that, although Article 2 of the Tribunal's Statute ap-
plied only in international armed conflicts, Article 3 applied to war
crimes "regardless of whether they are committed in internal or inter-
national armed conflicts." 6 The Tribunal based its decision on its per-
ception of the trend in international law in which "the distinction be-
tween interstate wars and civil wars is losing its value as far as
human beings are concerned."7
While distinguished commentators such as Professors Meron and
Paust have argued convincingly for acceptance of individual responsi-
bility for violations of the Geneva Conventions and the Protocols addi-
tional thereto in the context of internal armed conflict," such recogni-
tion would constitute progressive development of international law,
rather than acknowledgment of a rule that is beyond doubt found in
existing law. In addition to raising the ex post facto criticism, there is a
second important reason for the Tribunal to exercise greater caution in
construing its jurisdiction: States will not have faith in the integrity of
the Tribunal as a precedent for other ad hoc tribunals and for a per-
manent international criminal court if the Tribunal is perceived as
prone to expansive interpretations of its jurisdiction.
Another criticism of Nuremberg was that those acquitted by the
Tribunal were retried and convicted in subsequent proceedings before
national courts. The Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal, in contrast,
expressly protects defendants against double jeopardy by prohibiting
national courts from retrying persons who have been tried by the In-
ternational Tribunal.9 However, by permitting the Tribunal's Prosecu-
tor to appeal an acquittal,10 the Tribunal itself may infringe the ac-
cused's interest in finality which underlies the double jeopardy
principle. The U.S. Constitutional prohibition of double jeopardy pro-
hibits prosecution appeals of acquittals. The prohibition is not against
being twice punished, but against being twice forced to stand trial for
the same offense. There are two important rationales for the rule. One
rationale is that the trial itself is a great ordeal, and once the defend-
ant is acquitted, the ordeal must end." The other is based on the in-
5. Preliminary Remarks of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 22 Feb.
1993, reprinted in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL SCHARF, AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTER-
NATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 391 (1995).
6. Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 Oct.
1995, IT Doc. IT-94-1-AR72, at 68. Judge Li dissented from this conclusion.
7. Id. at 54.
8. See Theodor Meron, International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM.
J. INT'L L. 554 (1995); Jordan Paust, Applicability of International Criminal Laws to
Events in the Former Yugoslavia, 9 Am. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y. 499, 521-22 (1994).
9. Statute for the Yugoslav Tribunal, supra note 4, art. 10(1).
10. Id. art 25.
11. See Ball v. United States, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896).
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creased risk of an erroneous conviction that may occur if the state,
with its superior resources, were allowed to retry an individual until it
finally obtained a conviction.u These rationales are just as applicable
to prosecution before an international criminal court as to domestic
prosecutions. The International Tribunal's Prosecutor, together with
State authorities assisting the Prosecutor, will have the full resources
of the court and several interested States behind it, while defendants
and their counsel will be acting alone to refute guilt.
Nuremberg has also been criticized for its failure to provide for
the right of appeal. The Statute of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has been
recognized as constituting a major advancement over Nuremberg by
guaranteeing the right of appeal and providing for a separate court of
appeal. However, the procedure for the selection of judges by the Gen-
eral Assembly did not differentiate between trial and appellate judges,
leaving the decision to be worked out by the judges themselves. At the
Hague, this became the subject of an acrimonious debate, since nearly
all the judges wished to be appointed to the appeals chamber, which
was viewed to be the more prestigious assignment. As a compromise,
the judges agreed that assignments would be for an initial period of
one year and subject to "rotat[ion] on a regular basis" thereafter.13 The
rotation principle adopted by the judges is at odds with the provisions
of the Tribunal's Statute intended to maintain a clear distinction be-
tween the two levels of jurisdiction. Article 12 provides that there shall
be three judges in each Trial Chamber and five judges in the Appeals
Chamber, and Article 14(3) expressly states that a judge shall serve
only in the chamber to which he or she is assigned. These provisions
were intended to ensure the right of an accused to have an adverse
judgment and sentence in a criminal case reviewed by "a higher tribu-
nal according to law," as required by Article 14 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The purpose of the principle of
the double degree of jurisdiction under which judges of the same rank
do not review each other's decision is to avoid undermining the integ-
rity of the appeals process as a result of the judges' hesitancy to re-
verse decisions and avoid the future reversal of their own decisions.
14
The rotation principle, therefore, undermines the Yugoslavia Tribunal's
appellate process.
Critics of Nuremberg have pointed out that the Nuremberg Tribu-
nal failed to provide sufficient due process guarantees to the defend-
12. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957); United States v.
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 130 (1980).
13. Rule 27 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (Adopted on 11 Feb. 1994,
amended on 5 May 1994 and 4 Oct. 1993, and further revised on 30 Jan. 1995), U.N.
Doc. IT/32/Rev.3, 30 Jan. 1995, reprinted in Momius & ScHmw, supra note 5, at 41.
14. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Forty-Fifth Ses-




ants, and those it did provide were circumscribed by several pro-
prosecution judicial rulings. The most notable of such rulings was the
Nuremberg Tribunal's decision to allow the prosecutors to introduce ex
parte affidavits (depositions taken out of the presence of the accused or
his lawyer) of persons who were, in fact, available to testify at trial.
During the proceedings, the Nuremberg Tribunal took statements from
240 witnesses, and received 300,000 ex parte affidavits into evidence.
15
As Telford Taylor, one of the Prosecutors at Nuremberg, wrote: "Total
reliance on . . . untested depositions by unseen witnesses is certainly
not the most reliable road to factual accuracy. . . . Considering the
number of deponents and the play of emotional factors, not only faulty
observation but deliberate exaggeration must have warped many of the
reports." 6 Such ex parte affidavits seriously undermined the right of
the defendants to confront the witnesses against them. The U.S. Su-
preme Court has expressed the importance of this right as follows:
"Face-to-face confrontation generally serves to enhance the accuracy of
fact finding by reducing the risk that a witness will wrongfully impli-
cate an innocent person."
1 7
The jurisprudence of the Yugoslavia Tribunal has been stained by
this same criticism that tarnished the legacy of Nuremberg. At the
Prosecutor's request, the Yugoslavia Trial Chamber recently ruled that
the identity of several witnesses could be withheld indefinitely from
the defendant (Dusko Tadic) and his counsel, even throughout the
trial, in order to protect the witnesses and their families from retribu-
tion.'8 There are two problems with this decision. First, the Tribunal
decided to elevate the protection of victims above the accused's right of
confrontation, notwithstanding the fact that Article 20 of the Tribu-
nal's Statute requires that proceedings be conducted "with full respect
for the rights of the accused," and with merely "due regard for the pro-
tection of victims and witnesses." Simply put, the right to examine or
cross-examine witnesses cannot be effective without the right to know
the identity of adverse witnesses. As one noted commentator has
stated, "[Ilt is an almost impossible task to effectively cross-examine
an adverse witness without knowing that witness' name, background,
habitual residence, or whereabouts at the time of the events to which
he or she testifies."19 Second, the Yugoslavia Tribunal rationalized its
decision on the ground that the Tribunal is "comparable to a military
Tribunal" which has more "limited rights of due process and more leni-
15. JOE J. HEYDECKER & JOHANNEs LEEB, THE NUREMBERG TRIAL 94 (R.A. Downie
trans., 1962).
16. TELFORD TAYLOR. ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALs 174 (1992).
17. Maryland v. Craig, 497 US. 836, 846 (1990).
18. Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Protective Measures for Victims and Wit-
nesses, 10 Aug. 1995, IT. Doc. IT-94-I-T
19. Monroe Leigh, The Yugoslav Tribunal: The Use of Unnamed Witnesses Against
Accused, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 235 (1996).
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ent rules of evidence."20 It then cited favorably the practice of the Nu-
remberg Tribunal to admit hearsay evidence and ex parte affidavits
with greater frequency than would be appropriate in domestic trials. 21
What the Tribunal (apparently) failed to realize is that this practice
has in fact been a lightening rod for criticism of the Nuremberg
Tribunal.
22
Perhaps the most often-heard criticism of Nuremberg was that it
constituted "victor's justice." In contrast to Nuremberg, the Yugoslavia
Tribunal was created neither by the victors nor by the parties involved
in the conflict, but rather by the United Nations, representing the in-
ternational community of States. 23 The judges of the Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal come from all parts of the world, and are elected by the General
Assembly.24
On the other hand, the decision to establish the Yugoslavia Tribu-
nal was made by the U.N. Security Council, which has not remained
merely a neutral third party; rather, it has itself become deeply in-
volved in the conflict. The Security Council has imposed sanctions on
the side perceived to be most responsible for the conflict, the Serbs,25
and authorized the use of force and air strikes, 26 and sent in tens of
thousands of peacekeeping personnel.27 Its numerous resolutions have
been ignored and many of its peacekeeping troops have been injured or
killed; some have even been held hostage. Moreover, throughout the
conflict, the Security Council has (justifiably) favored the Bosnian
20. Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for Protective Measures for Victims and Wit-
nesses, Doc. IT-94-I-IT, at 15.
21. Id.
22. The Nuremberg Tribunal had also been severely criticized for allowing the pros-
ecutors to introduce ex parte affidavits against the accused over the objections of their
attorneys. See TAYLOR, supra note 16, at 241; AME.mcAN BAR ASSOCIATION SECTION OF IN-
TERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE, REPORT ON THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE
WAR CRIMES COMMITrED IN THE FORMER YuGosLAiA 27 (1993).
23. MORRIS & ScHARF, supra note 5, at 332.
24. Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, S.C.
Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3217th mtg., art. 12 and 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993).
25. S.C. Res. 757, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3082d mtg., UN. Doc. S/RES/757 (1992).
26. S.C. Res. 770, UN. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3106th mtg., UN. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992)
(authorizing force to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in Bosnia); S.C.
Res. 816, UN. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3191st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/816 (1993) (authorizing
force to enforce the no fly zone over Bosnia); S.C. Res. 820, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess.,
3200th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/820 (1993) (authorizing measures to prevent violations of
economic sanctions imposed on Serbia).
27. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 761, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3087th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/
761 (1992) (dispatching peacekeepers to ensure the security of Sarajevo airport); S.C.
Res. 762, UN. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3088th mtg., UN. Doc. S/RES/762 (1992) (dispatching
peacekeepers to "pink zones" in Croatia); S.C. Res. 776, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3114th
mtg., UN. Doc. S/RES/776 (1992) (dispatching peacekeepers to other parts of Bosnia to
facilitate delivery of aid); S.C. Res. 819, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3199th mtg., U.N. Doc.
S/RES/819 (1993) (dispatching peacekeepers to "safe areas" in Bosnia).
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Muslims and Croats over the Serbs. Although it imposed sweeping eco-
nomic sanctions on Serbia and the Bosnian Serbs; such action was
never even proposed when Croatian forces committed similar acts of
ethnic cleansing in central Bosnia in October 1993. Throughout the
conflict, the Council had been quite vocal in its condemnation of Serb
atrocities, but its criticisms of those committed by Muslims and Croats
were muted.
Although the Yugoslavia Tribunal is designed to be independent
from the Security Council, one cannot ignore that the Tribunal's Prose-
cutor was selected by the Security Council and its Judges were se-
lected by the General Assembly from a short list proposed by the Se-
curity Council. Indeed, given that the battle for control of Bosnia was
in large measure a religious war between Bosnian Muslims and Bos-
nian Serbs, it is astonishing that four of the eleven judges elected by
the General Assembly upon the nomination of the Council come from
States with predominantly Muslim populations.2s In contrast, the nom-
inee for the Tribunal's bench from Russia (the one state with the clos-
est historic ties to Serbia) was defeated ostensibly to avoid a pro-Serb
bias.29 While the Tribunal has jurisdiction to prosecute anyone respon-
sible for violations of international humanitarian law in the Former
Yugoslavia, the indictments so far have been overwhelmingly against
Serbs: as of the date of this writing, 46 Serbs have been indicted, 9
Croats, and 3 Muslims.
Finally, noting China's dismal human rights record, one commen-
tator has likened China's participation as a Permanent Member of the
Security Council in the establishment of the Tribunal, the selection of
its Prosecutor, and the nomination of its judges, as equivalent to Rus-
sia's presence on the Nuremberg Tribunal. 30 As long as the jurisdiction
of international criminal tribunals is triggered by a decision of the Se-
curity Council, and the prosecutors and judges are selected by the
Council, such tribunals will be susceptible to the criticism that they
are not completely neutral. This is one of the reasons the eventual es-
tablishment of a permanent international criminal court independent
from the Security Council is so important.
In his report to the President on the Nuremberg trials, Robert
Jackson said, "Many mistakes have been made and many inadequacies
28. Georges Michel Abi-Saab (Egypt), Adolphus Godwin Karibi-Whyte (Nigeria),
Rustam S. Sidhwa (Pakistan), and Lal Chand Bohrah (Malaysia). None of the Judges,
however, are, themselves, Muslim.
29. See Boris Krivoshei & Serbei Staroselsky, Russia Will Obey Tribunal on War
Crimes in Yugoslavia, TAss, Sept. 24, 1993, available on LEXIS, News Library,
CURNWS File.
30. Chaney supra note 3, at 82. Nuremberg has been criticized on the basis of "un-
clean hands" since Soviet judges convicted defendants for waging aggressive war and
mistreatment of prisoners despite the forcible Soviet annexation of the Baltic States and
appalling record of the Soviets regarding the treatment of their POWs.
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must be confessed. But I am consoled by the fact that in proceedings of
this novelty, errors and missteps may also be instructive to the fu-
ture."3 1 Just as the Yugoslavia Tribunal reflects a general improvement
over Nuremberg, the Statute and Rules of a Permanent International
Criminal Court must be crafted in a way that avoids the errors and
missteps of the Yugoslavia Tribunal which have been identified in this
Report.
31. Robert H. Jackson, Report to the President, Oct. 7, 1946.
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